Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis by Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Tax evasion as a determinant of
corruption: a game-theoretical analysis
Olena Sokolovska and Dmytro Sokolovskyi
Research Institute of Financial Law, State Fiscal Service of Ukraine
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66423/
MPRA Paper No. 66423, posted 3. September 2015 17:06 UTC
TAX EVASION AS A DETERMINANT OF CORRUPTION:  
A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Abstract 
We consider a static non-cooperative game theoretic model of tax evasion. Some 
concepts concerned with strategies of interaction between economic agents are formal-
ized in order to determine further possible presence of corrupt practices. 
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Introduction 
Tax evasion problem, resulting in reduction of tax revenue, is widespread in the 
world, especially in developing and emerging economies which results in. Its scope de-
termines a variety of tax evasion tools, where the bribes to tax officials are in the front 
rank. This necessitates an effective detecting of tax evaders in order to do not affect fair 
taxpayers. 
Our research provides the development of static non-cooperative non-zero sum 
game model in order to determine strategies of interaction between taxpayers and tax 
official.  
The application of game-theoretic tools to solve the problem of tax evasion first was 
made by M. Alligham & A. Sandmo (1972); they proposed a simple basic model of in-
teraction between taxpayer and tax inspector. Hereafter, J. Macrae (1982), S. Rose-
Ackerman (1975), В. Singh (1976), Т. Srinivasan (1973) analyzed principal general 
equilibrium effects and problems of optimization of correlation between identifying tax 
violation and amounts of penalties, and also application of those penalties to struggle 
with tax evasion and corruption. Asymmetric penalties and their role in fighting corrup-
tion were examined in J. Lambsdorff & M. Nell (2007). 
J. Andvig & K. Moene (1990) modeled corruption as a multiplayer coordination 
game in which supervisors can choose betwe en a bribery and honest strategy. Impact of 
quantity of information, available to the players (modeled by changing the degree of 
uncertainty) on corrupt behavior was investigated by S. Berninghaus et al. (2013). 
Mechanism of the bribery behavior based on the non-cooperative static game theo-
ry, notably in two- and three-level control systems was investigated by S. Lianju & 
P. Luyan (2011) and by A. Antonenko et al. (2012). Theoretical problem of intermedia-
tion in corrupt transactions using game-theory tolls was studied by G. Bayar (2009, 
2014), while M. Drugov et al. (2014) made an empirical estimation of intermediation in 
such transactions. 
Bribery transactions in different economic processes were investigated by 
I. Mostipan (2010) for bribes in traffic police, R. Cerqueti & R. Coppier (2010) ana-
lyzed interactions between polluting firms, tax inspectors and politicians in environmen-
tal policy making, P. Mauro (1995) provided an empirical assessment of impact of cor-
ruption on economic growth, N. Campos et al. (2010) studied impact of corruption on 
market access for manufacturing companies.  
But the autonomous analysis of tax evasion problem does not give the exhaustive in-
formation about reduction of tax revenue. Insufficiently fulfilled budget often takes 
place not because the agents do not pay taxes and do not declare their revenues (or an-
other tax base), but because of complexity of identifying the unfairness of their behav-
ior. Such situation can lead to certain problems for economy, notably to corruption and 
shadow sector growth, to capital flight and reducing of foreign investment as well. 
Thus, the important factor, which determines the actions of all interacting parties in 
tax evasion model, is the detection probability of unfair acts of taxpayer, and also the 
possibility of erroneously identified tax violation (in absence of tax evasion or bribes). 
In this context our model introduces the possibility of recognition the “fair” taxpayer as 
a tax evading person as well as traditional unsecured detection of taxpayers’ tax evasion 
by tax inspector. 
Methodology 
In our study, we assumed a common situation of interaction between taxpayer and 
tax inspector where: 
is a perfect demand elasticity for firms’ production (i.e. the producers do not shift 
their on consumers); 
taxpayers are bounded rational in their actions, i.e. they try to maximize their rev-
enues, irrespective to means of objective achievement, taking the decisions concerning 
tax evasion and bribes according to their awareness. 
motives of behavior are invariable for all economic agents. 
According to fact, that the tax payment supposes the interaction between taxpayers 
and tax officials, whose objectives and interests do not coincide, we presented this pro-
cess as the following two player game (1-5): 
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– set of tax official’s strategies, pr0 – to make an inspection of taxpayer; pr1 – do not 
make an inspection of taxpayer; 
 0 1;Ag ag ag         (3) 
– set of taxpayer’s strategies, ag0 – to evade tax; ag1 – do not evade tax; 
   
            
0;
Pr,
; 1 2ij
R
G Ag g
p R R q R q R R

           
 
   
      
 
         
0;
;
R
p R R R q R R

          
 
  
     
    (4) 
– tax official’s payoff matrix, 
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– taxpayer’s payoff matrix. 
Thus, the game (1-5) describes the interaction of two agents: tax official and tax-
payer; each of them has two pure strategies of behavior. The variables of game are di-
vided into the control parameters of government (τ, γ), the control parameters of tax of-
ficial (π) and the parameters (and functions) of environment (R, p, q). 
In comparison with the classical models and their extensions, our payoff functions 
(1-5) contain the “transparency” functions of interactions between players, p and q. 
Those functions are the environment parameters, which mean that they are not the part 
of tax official’s or taxpayer’s. I.e. tax official and taxpayer cannot change voluntary the 
values of those parameters; the tax official can effect on those values by varying the pa-
rameter π – amount of costs, directed to control of taxpayer’s actions. 
We assume that the values of those functions can have a significant impact on the 
behavior both of taxpayer and tax official. The answer on question about the interde-
pendence between p и q is not obvious. In a first approximation we can assume that the 
increase of π leads to increase of p and to decrease of q. 
Our research is based on the assumption that the whole set of interactions between 
taxpayers and tax officials is situated, generally, in one or another of three Nash equilib-
riums in pure strategies game (1-5): (p0; a0), (p1; a0), (p1; a1), because the equilibrium in 
mixed strategies is not stable and it is not achievable in practice and the equilibrium in 
pure strategies (p0; a1) is not possible.  
The conditions of achievement of each of three Nash equilibriums are the following. 
 0 0;pr ag : when the taxpayer uses the strategy ag0, for tax official the using of strategy 
pr0 must be more profitable than pr1; simultaneously, when the tax official uses the 
strategy pr0, for taxpayer the using of strategy ag0 must be more profitable than ag1: 
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After little transformations we obtain conditions for Nash equilibriums: 
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The players’ behavior, evidently depends on given values of parameters (pattern of 
functions) γ(πR), p(π) и q(π). 
Estimation of those parameters as well as empirical evaluation of given model call 
for further investigations. 
Conclusion  
Problem of identifying the unfairness of taxpayers’ behavior is complex. As a result, 
there is a possibility of erroneously identified tax violation (in absence of tax evasion or 
bribes). Our models suggest that interaction between taxpayers and tax official can be 
described as one of three of Nash equilibriums.  
In this spirit, we’ll be able to estimate real tax revenue. If official data of tax reve-
nue, obtained from credible sources, will differ from modeled results, one can assume 
the presence of large corrupt practices, notably by way of agreement between taxpayer 
and tax official.  
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